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PARALEGAL SERVICES AND 
AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
UNDER ARIZONA LAW 
BY LOUIS A. STAHL AND 
N. GREGORY SMITH 
S uccessful itigants are 
frequently entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees under Arizona law. 
Such an award may be based upon 
a specific contractual provision 
providing for fee recovery or upon 
a statutory authorizaiton. The 
broadest statutory authorization, 
A.R.S. §12-341.01, permits the 
court to award reasonable 
attorneys' fees to 'ie successful 
party in an action arising out of 
contract or in any action in which 
"the claim or defense constitutes 
harassment, is groundless and not 
made in good faith." While 
Arizona courts have been called 
upon to deal with several issues 
relating to the availability of 
attorneys' fees in particular 
situations, 2 they have not yet 
spoken definitively on the 
recoverability of fees attributable 
to paralegal participation in 
litigation.' Trial courts have 
reached inconsistent results on 
this question. Given the growing 
involvement of paralegals in the 
rendition of legal services, 4the 
question is one of increasing 
significance. It should be answered 
in the affirmative. Where 
attorneys' fees are recoverable at 
all, sound public policy requires 
that fees attributable to paralegals 
also be recoverable. 
There is little doubt that the 
effective use of paralegals can 
reduce clients' legal bills.5 This 
reason alone justifies the use of 
paralega:s whenever appropriate. 
But it does not compel the 
conclusion that courts should 
£
I. 
include paralegal services in 
attorneys' fees awards. Such a 
conclusion depends both on the 
propriety of considering paralegal 
time as an element of attorneys' 
fees and the purposes underlying 
an award of fees in the first place. 
Although no Arizona state court 
has made a definitive 
pronouncement on whether 
paralegal services may be included 
in an award of attorneys' fees, 
several courts in other 
jurisdictions have considered the 
matter. The results have varies, 
but most courts that have focused 
on the issue have held that 
paralegal time is a proper element 
to consider in awarding attorneys' 
fees. ' 
For example, the Ninth Circuit 
endorsed an award of attorneys' 
fees for paralegal time in Pacific 
CoastAgriculturalExport 
Association v. Sunkist Growers, 
Inc., 526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976), 
an antitrust case. In PacificCoast, 
a judgment was returned against 
1. See, e.g., Bouldin v. Turek, 125 Ariz. 77, 607 P.2d 954 (1979). 
Among the specific statutory provisions that allow attorneys' 
fees to be awarded are: A.R.S. §12-348 (certain actions involving 
the State of support action); A.R.S. §41-1481(J) (action for 
discrimination in employment); A.R.S. §13-2314(A) (civil 
action for injury from racketeering); A.R.S. §33-420(A) (action 
for invalid claim, lien or encumbrance on real property).
2 
. See, e.g., Bouldin v. Turek, supra (retroactivity of A.R.S. 
§12-341.01); Kromko v. State, 132 Ariz. 161, 644 P.2d 897 
(1982) (retroactivity of A.R.S. §12-348); Taylor v. Southern 
Pacific Transportation Co., 130 Ariz. 516, 637 P.2d 726 (1981) 
(attorneys' fees awarded under A.R.S. §12-341.01 as a sanction 
for violating a court order); Wenk v. Horizon Moving & Storage 
Co., 131 Ariz. 131, 639 P2d 321 (1982) (under A.R.S. 
§12-341.01, court may award attorneys' fees incurred in 
connection with appeal as well as fees incurred at trial court 
level): Schweiger v. Chi"a Doll Restaurant, Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 
673 P.2d 927 (Ct. App. 19831) (guidelines for preparing fee 
application and for determining a reasonable fee). 
3. Although the propriety of including paralegal time in an 
award of attorneys' fees seems to be a subject of dispute in 
connection with many of the applications for an award of fees 
that are filed in the Superior Court, the United States District 
Court for the District of Arizona has on several occasions 
approved an award of fees that includes paralegal time. See. e.g., 
State of Arizona v. Maricopa Coutv Medical Society 578 F. 
Supp. 1262 (D. Ariz. 1984), where Judge Carroll said: 
Paralegal time has been included as a part of the lodestar 
calculation rather than being allowed as costs. Once 
more, 1 realize this is an issue as to which courts differ. 
The use of paralegals. if properly supervised and 
directed, can be cost effective. It is reasonable to 
recognize and encourage a continuation of paralegal 
usage in appropriate circumstances. Knutson v. Daily 
Review. Inc., 479 F. Supp. 126:1, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1979); 
Richardson v. Restaurant Marketing Associates, Inc., 
527 F. Supp. 690,70(X (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
Id. at 1270. Also see Goddard v. Iahhitt, 547 F. Supp. 373, 378 
(D.Ariz. 1982) and Rurchett v. Hower, 470 F. supp. 1170, 
1172-73 (D). Ariz. 1979).
4 
. See, e.g., Fry, Emerging Work of Paralegals, 48 Fla. B.J. 742 
1974): Stevenson. I '"g" Paralegals in the Practice of Iaw, 62 
Ill. R.J. 432 (1974).
5 
. See, e.g., Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366, 373 
(E D. Pa. 1976); Ridman, Quality Iegal Services and a 
Reas nble Fee: Are They'"omptile', 14 Forum 427 (1979); 
t
Stevenson, I uing Paralegals in the Practiceof Law, supra.6 
See footnote 3. supra. 
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Sunkist, and the trial court 
awarded treble damages and 
attorneys' fees, including fees 
attributable to services performed 
by paralegals. In upholding the 
attorneys' fees award, the Ninth 
Circuit said: 
The [trial ]court also 
demonstrated considerable 
knowledge of the 
contributions made by legal 
assistants to the attorneys, 
noting 
"As a matter of practice, most 
attorneys engaged in the antitrust 
practice use such legal assistants, 
particularly in digesting and 
indexing discovery and trial 
materials, much of the work 
heretofore performed by relatively 
inexperienced lawyers.... As a 
matterofpolicy, the use of 
paralegalhelp in this fashion 
greatlyreducesthe costof legal 
services to thepublicandis thusa 
practiceto be encouraged." 
Id. at 1210, n. 19 (emphasis added). 
The Ninth Circuit again 
considered the propriety of 
awarding attorneys' fees for 
paralegal time in Todd Shipyards 




1176 (9th Cir. 1976). That action 
had been brought under the 
Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Worker's Compensation Act, 33 
U.S.C. §901, etseq. (1970). 
Although the Ninth Circuit read 
the statute as precluding an award 
of fees directly to a non-lawyer, 7 it 
nonetheless indicated that an 
award could be made for the 
reasonable value of time spent by a 
non-lawyer in assisting an 
attorney. The court reasoned: 
One of the necessary incidents 
of an attorney's fee is the 
attorney's maintaining of a 
competent staff to assist him. 
Paralegals and other assistants 
can free the attorney to spend 
his more costly time for 
greate-productivity in more 
important areas. 
In the instant case, allowing an 
attorney's paralegal assistant 
to be included as "reasonable 
attorney fees" not only saves 
the attorney time, but would 
save the employer here costs as 
well. Paralegals can do some of 
the work that the attorney 
would have to do anyway and 
can do it at substantially less 
cost per hour, resulting in less 
total cost billed to the 
cniployer. Therefore, paralegal 
time at paralegal rates can 
reasonably be counted along 
with the attorney's time as 
"attorneys' fees." 
545 F.2d at 1182. See also Spray-
Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto 
Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1250 (7th Cir. 
1982), aff'd 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984) 
(rejecting the view that paralegal 
fees are recoverable only to extent 
included as overhead in attorney 
billing rates); Liebman v. J. W. 
PetersenCoal & Oil Co., 63 F.R.D. 
684 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (holding that 
the use of non-lawyers to assist 
attorneys in the preparation of 
cases is desirable, and 
compensation for their services is 
appropriate); Haldermanv. 
PennhurstState School and 
Hospital,533 F. Supp. 649, 655-56 
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (reviews different 
approaches to the issue, and 
concludes that recovery of 
reasonable hourly fees for paralegal 
time is appropriate). 
Other courts have taken other 
approaches to the issue. A few 
courts have simply declined to 
allow any portion of an attorneys' 
fee award to be based on paralegal 
services, on the technical basis 
that paralegals are not 
"attorneys." For example, in 
TransWorldAirlines, Inc. v. 
Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 449 
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ve use of paralegals can reduce clients' legal bills. 
Af paralegals whenever appropriate. 
F.2d51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'don 
othergrounds,409 U.S. 363 (1973), 
the court "excluded some 4,000 
hours that are credited to persons 
who worked on the case but who 
were not members of the bar in the 
year that the services were 
rendered." And in Associationfor 
RetardedCitizens v. Olson, 561 F. 
Supp. 495 (D.N.D. 1982), 
modified, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 
1983), the court stated that 
services rendered by law clerks and 
paralegals "are not compensable as 
a separate item under Title 42 
U.S.C. §1988." Id. at 507. It 
observed that "work done by law 
clerks, paralegals, or expenses 
connected with secretaries are 
generally regarded as part of law 
office overhead." Id. at 507 and 
502. Also see Scheriff v. Beck, 452 
F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (D. Colo. 1978) 
(court declined to award sums for 
paralegals or law clerks under civil 
rights statute). 
While recognizing that 
paralegals are not "attorneys", 
other courts have nonetheless 
allowed a limited recovery of 
litigation "costs" based on the 
wages paid to paralegals. For 
example, in City ofDetroitv. 
GrinnellCorp., 356 F. Supp. 1380 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in partand 
rev'd inpart, 495 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 
1974), the District Court approved 
an award of attorneys' fees that 
included paraprofessional services, 
expressing the view that using 
paraprofessionals might reduce the 
cost of litigation. 356 F. Supp. at 
1390. On appeal, however, the 
Second Circuit reversed on the fees 
issue because the District Court 
had failed to hold an evidentiary 
hearing regarding attorneys' fees 
and had not employed the proper 
standards for making an award. 
495 F.2d at 473-74. The court also 
stated that paralegal time cannot 
be considered as a component of a 
fee award. But the court said that 
the wages of paraprofessionals 
were a reimbursable or taxable 
court cost. 495 F.2d at 473. On 
OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1984 
remand, the District Court 
concluded that the attorneys' fee 
award should include an allocation 
of $53,267.00 for 
"[p ]araprofessionals at cost." City 
ofDetroitv. GrinnellCorp., 1976-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) §60,913 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd in partand 
rev'd inparton otherissues,560 
F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977). Also see 
Greenspanv. Automobile Club of 
Michigan,536 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. 
Mich. 1982) (costs in civil rights 
action include wages paid to 
paralegals); Barnettv. Pritzker, 73 
F.R.D. 430,432 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(cost of paralegals added as 
expense item). 
This brief catalog of cases 
indicates that there are three 
general approaches to the 
treatment of paralegal time in 
making an attorneys' fee award. 
Recognizing that use of paralegals 
can promote lawyer efficiency and 
reduce client costs, some courts 
have sought to encourage such 
usage by allowing fee awards to 
include paralegal time. A few 
courts have rejected consideration 
of paralegal time on the technical 
ground that only attorneys can 
generate attorneys' fees. And, in a 
kind of compromise result, other 
courts have allowed the wages paid 
to paralegals to be assessed as 
9costs. 
As noted, the reported Arizona 
decisions do not deal explicitly 
with the issue. However, both the 
language and the legislati vt: history 
of Arizona's broad attorneys' fee 
statute, A.R.S. § 12-341.01, suggest 
that, as a matter of public policy, 
Arizona courts should include 
paralegal costs in making an award 
of attorneys' fees. A.R.S. 
§ 12-341.01 provides in relevant 
part: 
A. In any contested action 
arising out of a contract, 
express or implied, the court 
may award the successful 
party reasonable attorney's 
fees.. . . 
B. The award of reasonable 
attorney's fees awarded 
pursuant to subsection A 
should be made to mitigate the 
burden of the expense of 
litigation to establish a just 
claim or a just defense. It need 
not equal or relate to the 
attorney's f6Js actually paid or 
contracted, but such award 
may not exceed the amount 
paid or agreed to be paid. 
C. Reasonable attorney's fees 
shall be awarded by the court 
in any contested action upon 
clear and convincing evidence 
that the claim or defense 
constitutes harassment, is 
groundless and not made in 
good faith.. . . 
The aim of the statute is two-fold: 
to encourage meritorious claims 
and defenses while discouraging 
unjust ones. The legislative history 
of the statute underscores these 
purposes. In 1976, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee considered 
Senate Bill 1243, which contained 
an earlier version of the attorneys' 
fees provision. There was 
testimony presented to the 
Committee that the Bill was "a 
client relief bill" that would 
7. The statute in that case authorized an award of attorneys' fees 
to claimants utilizing the services of an "attorney at Law". 
8.312 F. Supp. at 482. The court did not identify the source of 
the 4,000 excluded hours, but it is likely that they represented 
the hours of law clerks or paraprofessionals. It should he noted 
that some later decisions by federal courts in the Second Circuit 
permit recovery of paralegal expenses as "costs." See, e.g., City 
o!Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), 
afi'dinpart andrev'dinpart, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974). 
9. In a further refinement of the issue, one court has suggested 
that fees should generally not be awarded for paralegal services, 
except that such fees could be awarded in complex antitrust 
cases to highly trained paralegals for services that would 
otherwise be performed by attorneys. See Postow v. Oriental 
Building Association, 455 F. Supp. 781, 787-88 (D.D.C. 1978), 
alfd in part and rev'd in part, 627 F.2d 1370 (1980). Of course, if 
the justification for the award is that specialized paralegals 
perform services that are otherwise performed by attorneys, that 
rationale certainly applies to other than antitrust cases. Indeed, 
in any case in which paralegal fees are requested as part of an 
award, it would he appropriate for the court to consider, as part 
of its determination of the reasonableness of the fee, whether the 
work done by paralegals is work "that has traditionally been 
done by an attorney." See Jones . Armstrong Cork Co.. 630 
F.2d 324, 325 n.1 5th Cir. 1980); (omment, Court Awarded 
Attorneys' Fees in Recognition of Student Lawyering, 130 U. 
Pal .. Rev. 162 (1981). 
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penalize "the unscrupulous 
defendant" and afford reasonable 
attorneys' fees to prevailing 
parties. Minutes of the Committee 
on the Judiciary, Journal of the 
Senate, First Special Session 1976, 
March 1, 1976, at 14, and March 
29, 1976, at 3. It was also suggested 
that the effect of the Bill would be 
to reduce the volume of litigation 
by deterring non-meritorious 
litigation. Id. These same purposes 
were reiterated during the 
Committee's 1978 consideration of 
amendments to discourage "unjust 
claims and defenses." Specifically, 
it was hoped that the legislation 
would "make people think twice 
about asserting a claim which is 
not made in good faith or a defense 
which is not made in good faith." 
Minutes of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Journal of the Senate, 
First Special Session 1978, March 
27, 1978 at 6. Othci testimony 
before the Committee emphasized 
the need to encourage meritorious 
lawsuits by removing the fear that 
the attorneys' fees incurred would 
If paralegal services 
are not considered 
as an clement of 
an attorneys' fee 
award, increased 
litigation costs will 
be encouraged. 
be greater than the likely recovery. 
Id. at 7. 
The policy favoring mitigation 
of legal fees incurred by parties 
with meritorious claims and 
defenses would be advanced by 
allowing paralegal services to be 
considered and, where appropriate, 
included in awards of attorneys' 
fees. Such an allowance would tend 
to encourage utilization of less 
expensive paralegal services for 
appropriate litigation tasks by 
reducing costs to the client during 
the pendency of the litigation and 
by shifting to the losing party the 
reasonable costs of work done by 
paralegals upon the conclusionof 
the litigation. 
In contrast, if paralegal services 
are not considered as an element of 
an attorneys' fee award, increased 
litigation costs will be encouraged. 
While an attorney might otherwise 
prefer to utilize paralegal services 
for some aspects of a litigated 
matter, if such services cannot be 
recovered as part of a fees award, a 
decision to utilize paralegals could 
actually inure to the client's 
disadvantage in the event of 
success, since a correspondingly 
smaller portion of the bill would be 
eligible for fee shifting. Ironically, 
the decision to utilize paralegals 
would benefit the client most in 
the event of failure, since his bill 
for legal services would at least be 
reduced to the extent of the 
paralegal time used. Of course, this 
benefit would hardly console a 
client, who, in addition to losing 
the lawsuit, might also be required 
to bear the attorneys' fees of the 
prevailing party. Pt.blic policy thus 
supports inclusion of paralegal 
Your client may be a sore loser. 
Then, what kind 
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* If you are o lawyer involved in o personal 
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24/ARIZONA BAR JOURNAL OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1984 
There maybe atime when a 
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cient's frmily thantheir dosest friend. 
Help make awise choice. 
When you assist your client in preparing a 
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services in awards of attorneys' prevailing party would be billed for 
fees. that portion of paralegal services 
These considerations also which is not recoverable as costs, 
suggest the inadequacy of both the and that differential might exceed 
"technical approach to attorneys' the amount the client would have 
fees, as illustrated by the had to pay if the work had been 
Association for RetardedCitizens performed by an attorney whose 
case and the "reimbursable cost" hourly cost could have been shifted 
approach reflected in the Grinnell to the losing party. 
decision. Neither of these These alternative approaches 
approaches would permit the suffer from other deficiencies as 
prevailing party to receive the full well. First, it should be noted that 
benefit of fee-shifting for paralegal even the technical approach to 
charges. Even under the attorneys' fees still permits 
reimbursable cost approach, the indirect compensation for services 
If you hate to re-t ype





new Panasonic KX-E708 
practically does the work for you. Standard 8,000 character memory stores nearly
four pages of text. Expands to 32,000 characters Large. 40-character display
allows typist to see text on display. Versatile text editing feature permits typist to 
move text within a document to a different location in the same document, simply 
and without retyping. Selective text deletion is 
done electronically with the push of a button 
In short, the Panasonic KX-E708 does away 
with retyping headaches and worries As far as 
typists are concerned, it's the next best thing to 
a raise . maybe even better' 
ELEC TRONi( TyPE WRnTERS 
CALL TODAY FOR AN IN-OFFICE DEMONSTRATION: 
248-0456 
4502 North 16th Street at Campbell /Call 248-0456 
performed by non-lawyers. If not 
directly compensable, services 
rendered by secretaries and other 
office workers are routinely 
factored into client bills by way of 
the hourly rates charged by 
attorneys. Since such "overhead" 
factors are compensable in an 
attorneys' fee award, the technical 
approach to the issue is not as 
conceptually clear as it may seem 
to be at first. More importantly, to 
the extent a refusal to include 
paralegal services in an award of 
fees results in paralegal time being 
included in an attorney's hourly 
rate as part of overhead, other 
clients suffer to the extent the user 
of paralegal services does not bear 
the full costs of the 3ervices he 
actually uses.'" 
In addition, the technical 
approach is inconsistent with how 
attorneys' fees are perceived by the 
client. When a client receives a bill 
from an attorney who has utilized 
paralegal assistants, he is often 
expected to pay a single fee for the 
value of all legal se.vices rendered. 
Even when thebill is itemized, it is 
not suggested or understood by 
eit her the attorney or the client 
that the portion of legal services 
rendered by paralegals is somehow 
not a part of the attorneys' fee. 
.Judicial recognition of the reality 
that paralegal time is a legitimate 
component of at torneys' fees is 
some law irms may mot hill clients for paralegal services 
diremily, but inatead may adjust their attorney billing rates to 
reflect paralegal utihatiomn as part of overhead if this procedure 
in folowed. then a separate award for paralegal services should 
not he made. See e.g.. Municipal Authn t v Pennsvania.527 
F Supp 912. 991499 iM 1> Pa 19811 More comumonly, 
however. law hrms hill cient directly for paralegal .ervice. 
When this pnicedure is folliowed. courts should not treat the 
paralegal expenses as if they were overhead expenses See. eg., 
C'hapman v Pacife Teiepiione and 'ekiiraph 'n., 451 F. Supp 
77,82 (N 1) Cal 1978) 
it is arguable that the coat of providing paralegal law 
clerk services is an overhead cost just an any other 
employee coat, defrayed by attorneys out of the pruseeda 
frim their fees, and hence mit separately reimbursable 
Unlike the work of secretaries and other supporting 
personnel, however, the work of paralegals and law clerks 
is ordinarily charged directly to part icular litigatiion and 
is therefore a clearly identihable cost Were it to he 
treated ax an overhead expense. payable nut of the 
general receipts of the attorney, the acrossathe loard 
rist of services to the attorney's clients generally would 
Is burdened by paralegal costa incurred in connection 
with particular matters of ni interest or benefit it other 
client, 'he C'ourt therefore rejects the notion that the 
lost of providing these services should he tieated a a 
nin reimbursableoverhead expense 
In short, the technical ap rach to paralegal services may 
discmurage a frtifier slme sijin if casa ming the users of legal 
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therefore consistent with client 
experience and expectations. 
The reimbursable cost approach 
to the issue suffers from an 
additional difficulty as well. Under 
Arizona law, "costs" are rather 
strictly defined by statute, and the 
definition does not include charges 
attributable to paralegal services. 
See A.R.S. §12-332. Moreover, in 
Sweis v. Chatwin, 120 Ariz. 249, 
585 P.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1978), the 
Court of Appeals stated that unless 
provided for by statute, litigation 
expenses are not recoverable as 
costs. An avenue for exception 
might exist in A.R.S. 
§12-332(A)(6), which permits 
costs to include "lo ]ther 
disbursements made or incurred 
pursuant to an order or agreement 
of the parties." But even if a 
stipulated agreement were to be 
reached by the parties in a 
particular case to consider wage 
disbursements to paralegals as 
"costs," this would hardly be an 
adequate substitute for a general 
rule of consistent application." 
As a matter of sound public 
policy, Arizona courts should 
include paralegal services as an 
element in awards of attorneys' 
fees. Both the technical and the 
cost reimbursement approaches 
run counter to the public policy 
objective of reducing litigation 
costs for parties with meritorious 
claims or defenses. In addition to 
discouraging the proper allocation 
of litigation costs, they also suffer 
from other practical deficiencies, 
including, in the case of the cost 
reimbursement approach. a basic 
unworkability under Arizona law. 
No principle of Arizona law 
requires the adopt ion of either of 
these alternative approaches; 
accordingly, the door is open to a 
decision based upon the economic 
realities of the practice of law and 
upon the public policy favoring t he 
reduction of litigation costs. Both 
factors support the inclusion of 
paralegal services in awards of 
attorneys' fees. 
Some courts have alao criticized the cost reimbursement 
approach as inadequate because of its failure to fully account for 
normal overhead expensea and its tendency to discourage uae of 
paralegals Ser, e.g. Hrchardwn vRestaurant Marketing 
.4,sav'aie. Inc b27 F Sopp 69. 700 (ND Cal i'i . 
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Victor E. Schwartz* 
1974 a 434 pp a pr"ce" wth 1981 suppement $42 50 a ISBN 0.87473-075-9 
Arizona Enacts Comparative Negligence Statute 
Arizona has enacted a comparative negligence statute as part of its Uni-
form Contribution Among Tortfessors Act. The defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk are questions of fact; if either defense applies, it 
will reduce but not bar damages. The measure (Ch. 237) is effective August 30,
1964. 
Victor Schwartz' treatise, the definitive work on the subject, constitutes 
the best source for answers to the many and varied questions which arise in 
application of the doctrine. The work, cited in numerous court decisions, is a 
basic and reliable text that belongs on the desk of every attorney and in all 
court libraries. 
-Partner. Crowell & Moring. Washington, D.C.. Adjunct Professor of Law, American 
University Co-author. Prosser, Wade & Schwartz, Cases and Materials on Torts (7th ed. 
1982). Mr. Schwartz served as consultant to the Committee of the Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in preparation of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act 
and he is the principal author of the Uniform Preduct Liability Act. 
Be prepared! Order the volume now for 30 days' free examination. 
ORDER FORM 
The Allen Smith Compr .y AB 
1435 North Meridian Street 
Indianapolis, IN 46202 
;] Send COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE by Victor E. Schwartz, including 1981 
Supplement, $42.50. It is understood the book may be returned within 30 days 
for full credit or refund. If retained, forward future supplements as issued un-








Indiana residents, add sales tax. 
Check enclosed $ - postage/handling prepaid. 
Charge, plus postage/handling, payable 30 days from receipt of ship-
ment. 
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